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The diplomacy which led fromthe 9 May 1950 proposal known as the Schuman
Pl an to the creation el even months 1ater of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) ended one era---World War II and its aftermath---and began
anrthet"- --the great boom which con ti nue s , peace f u1 and uni nterrupted, to the
pr sent.

1

The Treaty of Paris, which concluded the negotiations for the heavy

in\ us try pool, did not pro vi de the framework for a grand European sett] ement
li\e Westphalia or Versailles, which shaped the politics and diplomacy of
Europe for decades; limited in scope to coa 1 and stee 1 ,. it changed no borders,
crlated no new military alliances, and resolved only a few. of the commercial
an~ financial

differences between states that stood in the way of Europe I s

delelopment into a s'ingle economic entity.

Nor did it create an institutional

eqlivaTent to such a grand settlement: the ECSC did not live up to the high
exhectations it raised.

While certain of its detractors have branded it a

I

supercartel , and oth1~rs di srni ssed it as a mere empty shell, only those with a
petsonal stake in its creation still insist that it served as the crucible of
a

new

"European

spirit"

destructive nati ona 1 i srn. l

strong

enough

to. have

overcome

the

forces

of

Yet the formation of the ECSC was indisputably the

fi 1st step towards the more ambitious ventures. in supranationa1 cooperation
whi\ch have since taken hold in Europe; it solved the Ruhr Problem without
whrh West German industry could not have become an engine of prosperity for
the economy of the

region, without which

the fragile

new structures

of

political democracy in Bonn might well have been irreparably weakened, and
wi 1ihout which Franco-German reconci 1 i ati on might well

I

.

have been delayed or

ha~e never even occurred.
No single person, interest, or nation solved the Ruhr Problem.

Jean

Monnet, the true author of the Schuman Pl an and the conductor of the Paris
negltiations, intended, in the name of Europe, to impose long-term controls on

I

'I
l
:
• I
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the German coal and steel industries in order to guarantee French security but
succeeded instead only in liberating them from· Alli.ed occupation authorities
and restoring their traditionally dominant position in the economy of Western
For.their part, the managers of Ruhr heavy industry wanted, plain and

Europe.

simple, to resurrect the international cartels of the interwar years, which
they

had

led.

These

were

private

organizations

whose

activities

governments of the peri ad either supported or· chose to overl oak.

the

But the

captains of West German industry would no longer be able to exercise sole
command in the coal-steel

field.

They emerged from the Schuman Plan as

partners in a large, new nee-corporatist enterprise with labor, the state, and
the other member-states of the ECSC.

This arrangement resembled nothing more

than an intricate sphere-shaped puzzle: painstaking to assemble and always
subject to collapse until, witti all parts· firmly interlocking-, the smooth,
round object almost inexplicably became nearly as di ffi cult to tear apart as
it once had been to put together.
While the 9 May 1950 announcement put _the Ruhr Problem at the head of the·
European agenda, it was not solved at the official coal-steel pool conference
in Paris but in collateral discussions that grew out of it.

Th~se took place

between the· United States, France and- Ge·rmany, within the Federal Republic
itself,

and among the six parti ci pati ng nations.

They concerned matters

deliberately excluded from the Paris sessions such as those arising from the
occupation, questions left unresolved by them such as the organization of the
High

Authority,

and

issues

whose

development

the

Schuman

Plan

pro'posal

affected such as the distribution of economic power in the new West German
state.
The Paris Conference, together with its many working pa.rties·, settled
mainly secondary matters of. intere·st to the. less influential

of the Six.
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Minor producers of coal and steel, the Dutch were painfully aware of being
dependent on and at the economic mercy •Of Germany, objected to all measures
impeding her revival, and· wanted institutional

guarantees to prevent their

Th~y succeeded early in th~ negotiations in winning Mormet 1 s

being imposed.

grudging assent to the supetimposition of a Council of Ministers, representing
the member governments, on the proposed central coal-steel directorate.2

The

Belgians and Italians were no less successful in pursuing their particular
aims, which were economic in character.
huge

subsidies,

the

one

for

ailing

At Paris both secured guarantees of·
coal

mines,

the

other

for

highly

capitalized new .steel mills built far from sources of raw materials.3

As for

.tiny Luxembourg, whose economic existence depended largely on the exports of a
single huge steel producer, its delegates preferred as a matter of principle
to negotiate on a private basis and played a largely ceremonial role at the
Schuman· Plan discussions.4

By necessity rather than ·choice ·this supporting
..

cast. of

coal-steel

players,

while

preserving

the

convenient

fiction

of

European participation, depended on the French and the Germans to work out a
satisfactory solution to the Ruhr Problem.
France's Post-World War II policy towards the notorious German i~dustrial
complex is now attracting considerable historical interest, and properly so.
While the French conviction that the Ruhr was the s.ource of German power, as
well as their own :humiliations, could border on the obsessive, under~iing it
was a practical concern: never was France I s dependence on the coal of the
region greater than after 1945.

Fuel scarcity was· endemic during these years

and, if it had persisted, might have imperilled the ambitious steel investment
· schemes of the Plan de Modernisatiori et d 1 Equippe~ent popularly called the
Monnet Plan.5

And what catastrophes might ensue, ~hen German stee_l, with the

experience of occ~pation behind it, once agai~ tried to reenter world markets?

4

Understandably, as Raymond Poidevin first stated in 1979,

11

The Ruhr question

was the main issue in all French efforts to solve the German problem after
1945. 11 6

In dealing with

it they

sought .to obtain two

things,

adequate

supplies of coal and a measure of control over future development·s which could
be exercised until the Germans had proved by good behavior that the need for
this had passed.,
two priorities,

Although emphasis shifted from time to time between these
there was never any break from the policy itself.

What

changed were its modes of application.
The figure of Jean Monnet is of i nes ti mab le importance in this respect.
While by 1950 numerous pl ans for ·a Franco-German reconciliation by means of a
heavy industry pool were in circulation, the 9 May proposal bears the .distinct.
imprint of his ideas.

Even more importantly, the coal-steel community might

either have remained on paper o~ developed in a quite ~ifferent direction had
he

not occupied unique

influence within France.

positions of trust within the

United States

and

Monnet had been a vendor of cognac to Eskimos in the

first decade of the century, an ailocator of shipping space in World War·r, a
senior civil ~ervant at the League of Nations in the 1920s, an international
investment banker

in

the

early

1930s and

the

director

of

an

ill-fated

industrial development scheme in Chiang Kai-Shek I s China during the latter
years of that decade.

But the United States was ·both the most decisive

influence on MonnetJs life and the main sou~ce of his power.

Rather than join

de Gaulle after the fall of France, Monnet, who during World War I had headed
the joint Angla-French supply committee, accepted appointment as head of the
British Supply Council

in Washington and soon found himself administering

lend-Lease operations.

Recognizing his unique range and depth of experience,

President Roosevelt reque.sted him shortly thereafter to direct the conversion
of the American civilian economy to armaments production; thus the Victory

5

Program was born.

Jean Monnet returned to France-at the end_of the war having

accumulated an immense capital

of goodwill

and acquired·

a:. group

of highly

influential friends including Henry Stimson, Averill Harriman, and John Foster
Dull es.

But Monnet went home with something else as well : a conviction that

survival required the
giant

production

11

Ameri cani zation II of French industry---the creation of

units

and

the

introduction

of

enlightened

management

methods.7
He was equally convinced that this could be accomplished by applying
approaches

u·sed

to mobilize

the

US war

economy~

One

of· them was

the

directorate princ·iple, and it involved endowing a dynamic individual with the
authority
interests.

necessary

to

override

entrenched

economic

The other was public relations-as-politics.

and

.bureaucratic

It involved clothing

official policy, however pedestrian or self-serving, in a lofty language of
. .

.

high principle and could easily be mistaken for demagogy.
Since

1946 Monnet

h~d- run

the

Plan de M6dernisation et d 1 Equippement

along these lines, in the process generating diffuse public support on the one
· hand and intense industrial and bureaucratic opposition on the other.

The

..

political independence, indeed the very survival, of the French Plan was due
singularly to Monne·t•s American connectfon.

It was this which enabled him to

raise the so-called Blum loan of May 1946 without which ·French reconstruction
would have collapsed.8

·He was also the man to whom Washington looked when

trying to decide how to dole out Marshall Plan funds.

In short, Monnet was

Paris' invaluable link to Washington and Washington's extremely useful lever
of policy in Paris, and his unusual amalgam of strengths and weaknesses, of
virtues and vices, would bear heavily on the settlement of the Ruhr question.
Here he could count on the unequivocal and unstinting supJ)ort of the United
States, would have to reckon with bitter and impassioned opposition from

6

within France,

and could expect to encounter awe,

but inspire

fear

and

distrust as well among the Six.
How did German industry view the announcement of the Schuman Pl an?

In

the only way imaginable under the circumstances: as the grant of a reprieve
from the sentence hanging over its head.

The radio address delivered by

France's Foreign Minister on 9 May 1950 concluded the worst five years in the
history of the Ruhr.

Since the war both coal and steel had operated at huge

losses and, while· the condition of the mines

gradually improved,

no new

investme·nt whatsoever had taken place at the mills, a situation in sharp
contrast to that prevailing in the rest of Europe.9
it.

But this was the least of

There seemed to be little chance after 1945 that either private ownership

or the maze of interconnected pipelines cons ti tuti ng the energy exchange grid
known as the Verbundwirtschaft (tied-in economy) would ever be restored.
whole

months

at

a

time

the

very

physical

1nstal l ati ons - even seemed in jeopardy.

existence

of

key

For

production

The Ruhr's list of woes _began -with

physical damage to plant caused during the war, which reduced steel outputs
from 18.3 million tons in 1944 to 1.5 million tons in 1945.

The war also

reduced the number of mines in operation by a th.ird, but an even more serious
coal

problem was

the

ugly,

nagg_ing

reality

of

human

fatigue:

years

of

overexertion and undernourishment -resulted in catastroph1 c reductions in mi n·er
daily output. which

took many more years

to overcome.

- It was not until

mi d-1948 that production took a decisive turn for the better and acute coal
shortages throughout the economy of Germany-and Western Europe ended.10
The political problems of heavy industry remained even more persistent.
The Allies,

though

seldom in agreement as

to method,

were

unanimous

in

desiring to punish "The Ruhr" for having presumably brought Hitler to power and masterminded his

policy of aggression.

The campaign to destroy_ the

7

coal-steel complex continued tb be waged long after the war was over.
1945

the

British

seized

Ruhr

industrial

assets,

declared

them

In July
forfeit,

dissolved all cartels as well as other producer associations dating from the
Third Reich,

and set up control

boards to administer the coal

and steel

industries.

In December 1945 they arrested nearly all · senior managers of

Konzerne in their Zone of Occupation and interned them for periods of from six
to eighteen months in labor camps (Arbeitserziehungslage) such as the one at
Bad

Nenndorf.

German

memori sts

attribute

these

incarcerations,

never

publically explained by the Allies themselves, to an intention to silence
critics of the decartelization and dismantlement plans then being hatched.12
These_included,

first of all,

Kohlenbergbauleitung

(DKBL)

the

(German

set up·in July 1947 of the Deutsche
Coal

Mining

Management)

to

serve

as

trustee for the industry until, at some un_disclosed future date~ the Germans
themselves would be allowed either to nationalize it, as the British wished~
or break- it up into small, competitive production units as desired by their
American Bizonal partner.13
But the locus of power in the Ruhr Konz~rne was in steel and here the
British proceeded more slowly.
1946 with

11

They started the process of reorganization in

0peration Severance, 11 in which, as the name implies, sma1·1 new

production companies were carved out of the trusts.
nominally autonomous.

But these become only

Deconcentrati on did not resume unti 1 - November 1948

when, with the publication of UK M.ilitary Government Law 56 along with its
American counterpart Law 75, a bipartite Steel Group was set up to- supervise
the industry.

This board, however, became the scene of almost uninterrupted

Anglo-American squabbling over both the ownership issue and the future role of
the. German coal -steel complex.
industry,

once

purged

of·

11

_The United States fully intended that Ruhr

cartel ism, 11

should

reach

a maximum 1evel

of

8

I

.

.

competitiveness so that it could serve as motor of European economic recovery.
To the UK representatives, this policy made no sense.

Their heavy industry

had been thoroughly cartelized between the wars with government encouragement
and was then in the process of being nationalized; to them US anti-trust
theory was at best e-conomic mumbo-jumbo and at worst a self-serving formula
for domination of world markets.

The main British concern was to protect

their own vulnerable industry, and they were certainly in no hurry to revive a
fearsome competitor.

The.Bizonal partners could in fact agree only on on~

thing, to assign responsibility for directing the reorganization of the steel
industry to the German steel trusteeship (Stahltreuhandvereinigung).

But the

trusteeship 1 s planners themselves soon got bogged down in a futile attempt to
blend British insistence on social responsibility and American _demands for
market responsiveness with German longings for an economy under collective
corporate control

(Gemeinwirtschaft).14

With

unanswered memoranda piling up, the once-feared

proposals
11

proliferating

a~d

decartelization 11 policy was

rapidly becoming a farce by 1950.
Not
worries.

11

decartelization 11 but dismantlement headed the lengthy list of German
Although long planned, this began in earnest only at a late d~te, in

Fall 1947, when a list of 682 factortes deemed either
11

excessive 11 was published.

11

armaments-related 11 or

The importance_of the dismantlement effort should

not be underestimated merely because it seems inconsistent with US- rec-overy
policy.

Heated

administered
threatening

protests

Marshall
mass

from

both

Pl an - aid,

demonstrations

the

and
in

European

the
the

US

11

140 factories

partially 11 disassembled and removed.

Congress---not

Ruhr---succeeded -in

dismantlement list reduced but not eliminated.
action officially ended,

Recov_ery Program, which

had been

to

mention

having

the

By December 1950, when the
11

totally 11 and -anothe_r 78

The axe fell particularly hard on the

9

steel

industry.

HeinrichshUtte,
casualties.15

The
and

August
the

Thyssen

Hutte,

Niederrheihishche

the
Hutte

Bochumer
were

Verein,

all

the

prominent

The action was st.ill underway on the day of the Schuman Plan

proposal.
But the dawning of the new half-century did cast· at least a little light
on the Ruhr.

For .several months there had been a German government in Bonn.

It opposed socialization and was doing everything within its still. limited
power to promote a . Ruhr restoration.

Producer associ ati ans) of a di sti nctl y

traditional type were also re-forming and drawing together.
neither the British nor the

Like it or not,

Americans could run the West German economy

except through local intermediaries and this implied resort to tried and true
methods.

The· directors

of· the

old

cartel,

the

Rheinisch Westfalisches

Kohlensyndikat, ran the agency set up by the British to allocate coal, the
Deutsche Kohlen Verkauf (DKV}, which in fact also occupied th~ premises of the
earlier organization.16.
manufacturers I

Although a steel cartel was strictly proscribed, a

asoci ati on

named

the

Wi rtschaftsverei ni gung der Eisen- und

Stahlindustrie (WVESI} provided a forum in which the mill directors hammered
out common policy for the industry.

WVESI also housed sectional subdivisions

for each main steel product line, which had about them the distinct reek of
something left over from before the war.17
ordered

Ruhr

producers

to

set

up

and

In mid-1949 the Bizonal partners

run the Fachstelle Eisen und Stahl

(Office for Iron and Steel), vesting it with the authority to regulate the
importation, exportation, and distribution of ferrous products as well as
certain raw materials used in their manufacture .18

By the end of 1949 the

capstone to this edifice, the Federal Industry Association (Bundesverband der
Deutschen . Industri e) was being put into pl ace .19
The steel crisis·of 1949, temporary though it turned out to.be, also

10

beamed a few rays of hope into the Ruhr, if only indirectly.· By rekindling
fears that excess steel capacities would pl ague i nternatfonal markets as in
the 1920s and 1930s, the crisis caused European producers to seek some form of
accommodation

with

their

German

counterparts.

Their

concerns

were

understandable enough: altho·ugh in 1947 only 26 million tons of steel were
produced,the industry would have 41 million tons of capacity by 1951.
would happen once Germany had returned to world markets?
limit outputs seemed called for~2Q

What

An agreement to

In September 1949 the steel committee of

the 0EEC proposed the introduction of coordinated planning of production and
exports.

This

presumed

the

resumption,

in· some

form,

of

the

friendly

..

relationships maintained between

the wars by the leading members. of the

international steel cartel, Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg.21

This

. was something the steelmen of the Ruhr had only dreamt of since VE-Day.
The

Internationale Roheisen Gemeinschaft

Internationale Roheisenexportgemeinschaft),

(after

although

1933
a

officially

red

flag

to

the
US

policy-makers after World War II, was considered by European industrialists
and statesmen alike to have been one of the few real achievements of interwar
foreign and commercial policy.22

The International

Steel

Cartel

(ISC) was

anchored in an agreement between French and Ruhr industrialists concerrying
sales in South Germany and the Saar but soon grew into a general understanding
among all West European steel producers to· share world export markets.

The

1926 agreement is due part of the credit for ushering in the Franco-German
detente of the 1 ate 1920s.

Al though neither the thaw nor the steel cartel

itself survived the ~avages of the depression, the ISC was revived in 1933.
This

time

it worked,

stabilizing

steel

export prices

and enabling most

producers to operate at a profit despite a persistent lag in demand on foreign
markets.

By- 1939 the ISC controlled over. eighty-five percent of the world

11

trade in steel, all producing nations with the exception of Sweden and Japan
being affiliated.with it.

Complementary agreements in the Western European

coal trade also cropped up during the 1930s.23

These provided at least some

-basis

like

for

hope

that

international

agreements

those

in - steel

could -

gradually be extended throughout industry and eventually culminate in pacts
between national produGer associations.

This became a major goal of

11

economic

appeasers II in the months after . the September 1938 Muni ch Conference, and
although tMs policy proved hopelessly inadequate as a means of averting war,
the good relations prevailing within West European heavy industry survived
both battles and occupation.24

This was a reality that post-1945 political

conditions could mask but not fundamentally change.
France _provided the key to the revival of _traditional arrangements in
West Europe heavy industry.

Nothing could have been done in this respect

prior to 1947, if only because business travel to and from the British Zone
was all but impossible.25
1947 .Marshall

A change in atmosphere .first occurred with the June

Plan announcement, which pointedly mentioned the need for a

German contribution to European reconstruction.
cue.

In August a former steel

association executive named Fritz Hellwig

produced a l engthY policy statement entitled
Steel? 11

which,

The -Ruhr soon took up the

11

Lorrai ne Steel instead of Ruhr

although an attack ·on French policy,. proclaimed a German

readiness to make substantial

concessions in order to restore traditional

friendships in heavy industry.26

In December 1947·Robert Pferdmenges, the

Cologne banker who served as Adenauer's personal economic advisor, sweetened
the deal: he approached the de Wendel interests with an offer of nothing less
than a 50 percent participation in the Ruhr steel industry.
not

rise

to

the

bait.27

II

Hermann· Punder, - the

former

The French did
head

of

the

proto-government set up by the Anglo-Americans known as the Economic Council,

12

delivered his famous

11

Word to France 11 in order to convi nee the French of the

seriousness of German intentions to make · amends.

Noting that the Marshall

.

.

~

Pl an had smoothed the way- to a new type of European cooperation·, Punder
acknowledged the justice of France's historic grievances and admitted that any
attempt to redress them with mere words would fail.

He pleaded only that

Frenchmen temporarily suspend judgments -to enable Germans to prove by deeds
11

that they could be
Europe. 11 28

good neighbors and eventually even friends in an organized

In an - effort to head off the

impending dismantlement of the

August-Thyssen-Hiltte an· offer like that of Pferdmenges was again made in
October 1949, this time as the so-called Lehr Pl an.
Dusse l dorf,

who

al so

sat

on

the

supervisory

Named after the mayor of
boi;ird

of

the

Verei ni gte

Stahlwerke, it contained a detailed, carefully constructed scenario for the
French takeover of this, the largest pre-war German heavyindustry Konzern.29
French readiness to consider such offers grew as the restoration of
German power approached.
makers

of

French

If with the announcement . of the Marshall Pl an the

policy

resigned

themselves_ to

an

eventual

cooperative

arrangement with a revived West Germany, both timing and terms still remained
to be_ worked out.
(IRA),

an. issue

The proposal · to create an International Ruhr Authority
discussed

and

debated

interminably

at

the

1948

London

tripartite conferences over the future of Germany, was the first important
French initiative to foresee some such accommodation with the neighbor to the
east.

Although IRA was to make provision for a measure of eventual German

representation, the specifics of the arrangement are unimportant since, in
spite of all
stillborn.

the trouble that went into its making, the organization was
This dismal failure did not prevent France from- desiring a closer

relationship - with

Germany.

Such

policy-making after January 1948.

a

wish

i ncreas i ngl y

pervaded

.French

It was then that Foreign Minister Georges

13

Bidault instructed French Military Governor Koenig that

11

German recovery in

the cadre of Europe should take place as rapidli as possible. 11 31

The desire

for reconciliation is equally evident in numerous position papers produced
over the year by "the Quai 1 s central European desk and in business circles as
well.32
11

The first actual initiatives also date from 1948.

In mid-September

major French industrialists 11 met at Essen with·German counterparts to arrive

at ways and means to establish
February

1949,

the

President

11

closer financial and economic ties. 11 33

of

the

Metal l gesel l schaft,

On 3

Richard Merton,

learned to his pleasant surprise from a Mr. Marx of the German section of the
Quai that both Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and French High Commissioner
Andre

Fransois-Pom;et

were

keen

to

11

establish

lasting

and. completely

forthright cooperation with Germany. 11 34 This was more than a mere wish.

In

mid-su1T111er 1949 Monnet directed the Plan to produce a series of comparative
studies of the French and German economies for possible

use. in

11

future

ccioperative projects. 11 Significantly, he also requested the ministries of the
Federal

Republic,

which

eagerly

complied,

to

supply

the

plan

with

raw

data---s.tatistics concerning population, land use, industrial outputs, levels
of

capacity

transportation.

utilization,

energy

consumption,

cost

•of

living

and

The studies were supposed to focus on practices of dual

pricing, comparisons of real wages, and a number of other issues in the fields
of .transport, energ.y and tariffs.35
.The first joint economic conference at the ministerial level took place
on 29 August 1949 in Tubingen, when Foreign Minister Schuman and French High
Commissioner

Fran~ois-Poncet met with

Marshall Pl an, Karl Albrecht.

the West

German Minister· for

the

The most interesting proposal to emerge from

the encounter was Albrecht's suggestion for a new agreement along the lines of
the 1921 Wiesbaden Accord between German Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau and

14

French Minister for Reconstruction Louis Loucheur, which called for the French
to assist ·in raising Ruhr coal

outputs and the Germans to guarantee coal .

deliveries in exchange for French grain.
represented

the

most

serious

Although never ratified, this deal

post-World

Franco-German economic settlement.

War

I

attempt

to

work

out

a

In addition to a new Wiesbaden Accord,

Albrecht proposed joint energy planning and the canalisation of the Moselle.
Schuman

responded

enthusi asti cal ly

to

conclusion that discussions be continued

all

these

ideas

and

suggested

in

between the responsible West German

Ministries and the French Plan.36
Still

another important meeting,

this one between French and German

parliamentarians, took place on 26 and 27 November 1949 in Bernkastel at the
behest,

it appears,

of

the

French

Socialist Andre

impending steel glut was the main issue at hand.

Philip.

The

dreaded

Philip sought to persuade

the Germans to support his attempt to work a new international steel cartel,
negotiations for which had then already started,

into the framework of a

general heavy industry settlement for Western Europe.

Al though not about to

drop French i nsi s:tence on the need for a special Al .1 i ed office to supervise
Ruhr heavy industry, Phiiip did propose that an additional new international
steel authority be set up to administer the national industries of all the
nations of Western Europe, including France.

This was the first official hint

that the French might be willing to cede a measure of sovereign power in the
interests of reconciliation with Germany.

The responsibilites of the new

organization, Philip went on, would extend to overall investment policy as
well

as

the

steel-making.
• uni on

allocation

of coal,

ore,

and other

raw materials

used

in

Philip further pointed out the desirability of providing for

representation

at

the

seat

well-received by Carlo Schmidt,

of

the

new

authority,

a

suggestion

the SPD representative in attendance, and
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accepted as sound by GUnther Henle.
chairman

of

the

Board

politically-minded

at

among

A CDU Bundestag delegate, Henle was

the

Klockner

leading

steel

Konzern

and

one

industrialists.

of

the

While

few

hardly

enthusiastic about possible power-sharing arrangements with the SPD, Henle
recognized that its support for a proposal like Philip 1 s would be essential,
as otherwise 11 • • • the

value of any treaty would have to be devalued by forty

11

percent. 37 As a sequel to the conference Philp barnstor~ed the

Ruhr in

January 1950, triggering an immense outpouring of enthusiasm for his ideas.
In

the meantime,

negotiations

for

a new

international

steel

cartel

proceeded laboriously.· This is not surprising: it had taken over a year to
work out the Saar arrangement in which the 1926 agreement was anchored.38

And

the Adenauer gov~rnment in Banh, only recently installed in its offices, still
·had to tread softly.

Yet pressing problems with the regard to the Saar were

begging for a solution..
agreement with France.

These were caused by the 11 February 1950 tariff
The Ruhr was highly dissatisfied with it because the

French refused to allow Bonn to extend the German tariff around their Zone of
gaping hole in the west 11 through which goods could

Occupation, leaving open a

11

fl ow onto German markets.

To stem this, Ruhr steel producers demanded freight

rate reducti ans from the_ Bundesbahn and

11

pri vate understandings II with French

iron and steel over South German markets, .any more binding form of agreement
being strictly forbidden. 39

In early March 1950 a del egati.on from the Soci ete

Commercial e. de Fonte. headed by a M. Lequi pe came to Boch um to seek additional
concessi ans from· the Germans claiming to possess a special mandate from his
. organization to discuss a general export agreement.
interested
Lequi pe,

only
who

in

immediate

could make

no

advantages,
further

the

progress,

Ruhr
in

Suspecting him of being
refused

to

concluding

talk.

M.

di scussi ans

reiterated that French producers---and specifically the Soci ete des Produi ts
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Siderurgique (--the general . industry cartel )---were determined, indeed had
resolved unanimously, to

11

pursue an export understanding with Germany. 11

promi"sed to - take all necessary measures to

11

He

promote the idea of such an

agreement among .the membership of the SCF. 11 40
Another meeting took pl ace between M. Lequi pe and Ruhr producers on 18
March but it was limited to export arrangements for the Halberger Hutte,
Brebach/Saar.

A third round ·began on 14 April _and was sti 11 under way when

the 9 May announcement intervened. 41

Whether in - the absence of the Schuman

_ Plan proposal thesi talks might eventualli have resulted in the conclusion of
another 1926.:..like arrangement is a matter for conjecture.

Certain it is,

however, - that any such deal wolil d have needed the approval

of US High

Commissioner John J. McCloy.
In respect to· him, Ruhr industrialists had detected more than mere
glimmers of hope.

Although a faithful servant of American national policy,

McCl oy had let it be known that he personally had little use for either
dismantlement or decartelization.
1949, for instance,- that

11

He told the State Department in September

As far as I can see the dismantlement process has

little value to us, if any, and its abrasive character is- so great that it
affects us as well as the British ••• we are risking some of our main objectives
by c:ontinuing with it so long after.hostilities have ceased ••• we might give a
solid support to the entire framework of the new gov~rnment by a modification
of this policy and at the same time attain certain advantages that [will] move
us ahead considerably. 11 42

The powerful future managing director of Thyssen,

Hans-Gunther Sohl, who was then one of the three liquidators of Verei ni gte
Stahlwerke, re.calls in his memoirs that McCloy's sentiments were reflected in
the UK/US Stee_l Control Group, whose American members

11

•••

William J.M. Kelly,

Mr. Tokish, and Henning B. Dieter were of Irish, Hungarian, and German-origins
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respectively.
possible,

They tried to get into· close contact with us as soon as

leaving

decartelization,

no

doubt

and were

about

always

their

critical

cooperative ••• 11 43

views

concerning

In.·October 1949 Sohl

reported to Mayor Lehr that Mccroy had nearly overcome the resistance of High
. Cammi ss i oners Fran~oi s-Poncet and Robertson to settling the dismantlement
issue

11

0n German terms. 11

On 23 February 1950 Sohl excitedly wrote Lehr that

the US High Commissioner now fully recognized ·German 1 s need for a continuous
wide-strip rolling mill at the August-Thysseri-Hiltte in Duisburg-Hamborn.

Men

from Mi:Cloy 1 s staff had even advised him, Sohl went on, to have Bonn .prepare
an

offi-ci al

study

to

show

that

production

increases

at

the

proposed

installation would not force German outputs ab.ave the Allied-authorized 11.1
million ton level.44

Sohl 1 s news was good indeed: the continuous wide-strip

rolling mill was the steel industry Wuriderwaffe of the era.

The erection of

one -of these mammoth new pl ants would bring the Ruhr •·s return to great power
status -0n world steel markets.
Yet it was anything but certain that this would occur.
the fate of the Ruhr_ still hung in the balance.

As of 9 May 1950

While the Schuman Plan

proposal did result in a temporary halt to dismantlements, the decartelization.
policy went on, its execution merely stalled by US-UK disagreement.

The

Adenauer government, while commited to a Ruhr restoration, had no direct
authority in the matter.

This was in the hands of Allied-created trusteeship

organizations, whose activities mirrored the contradittion and confusion in US
and UK Ruhr policy.

New investment such as at the proposed massive ATH

installation required the approval of Military Security Boards for coal and
steel upon which France, which was publically commited to opposing all new
. plant construction, exercised a veto power.
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II
The process set in motion by the Schuman Plan announcement would enable
the heavy industry complex of the Ruhr to slip the . noose pl aced around its
neck in 1945.45

This was not easy~ but in spite. of chafing and binding--,--not

to mention moments of gagging constriction---it succeeded, if not in:winnirig a
pardon, at least in having its sentence suspended and was later released for
time served.

The purported crime, never completely forgotten, merely faded in

memory over the passage of time.
The process itself must first of all be properly understood.

It i.ncl uded

discussions among the Six but extended far beyond the official sessions held
in Paris-, encompassing negotiations between the government of the Federal
Republic and the Allied High Commission--as well as between Ruhr producers,··
West German industry as a whole, and the unions:.
ended but rather were i nsti tliti onal i zed.

The latter never actually

The adoption of the extraordinary

self-help measure known as the Investitionshilfegesetz (Investment Aid Law)
through which West German industry as a whole subsidized the modernization of
coal and steel was one by-product . of this process.

The establishment of

co-determination (Mitbestimmung) on a permanent basis in coal and steel was
another.· Insti-tutionalizat.ion took place internationally ·as well, with the
forging of new links between national ministries atid producer associations to
replace those necessary bridges of commerce and contact blown a~ay during
World War I I.
economic

Directly and indirectly, the Schuman Pl.an brought the final

chapter

of

the

occupation

to_ an

end

on

terms

extraordinarily

favorable to the Ruhr, creating powerful new bonds that secured its power in
Germany and Germany's in Europe.
These results owe a good deal to Monnet's conduct, or: (as critics would
describe it) misconduct, of the negota:tions: what he set in motion he proved
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unable to control.

This is partly because his bargaining position was by no

means as strong as one might have expected.

It is true that the Sa human Pl an

had immense public appeal, undeniable that the small cadre of technocrats
constituting the Monnet team could argue circles around the slightly stodgy
bureaucrats representing the othe.r parties to the Paris negotiations, and
reasonable to assume that in a crisis Monnet could count on American support.
At the same time, he .was political.ly vulnerable ·at home.
could

reckon · with

support

from

the

French

coal

Although Monnet

industry,. which

was

nationalized and at the mercy of the Plan, the more powerful steel industry,
dominated by the maitres de forge of Lorraine, was another matter.46

Although

.the largest beneficiary of P.lan investment funds, they had come to distrust,
even to despise, Monnet himself and spearheaded opposition to the Schuman Plan
proposal , which in fact soon thoroughly pervaded French ,industry.

Nor could

Monnet draw on reserves of support from within the ·financial and economic
bureaucracies,. whose immobility he mocked and whose power he habitually sought
either to undermine or circumvent. 47
Monnet fully intended to dominate the Paris negotiations, conclude a
treaty in short order, and be installed as head of a coal-steel directorate·
with far-reaching powers • of intervention into the . West European industrial
economy.

It was not his purpose, as his ·Memoirs state quite explicitly; to

superintend the customary type of international conference in which delegates
·seek

acceptable

compromises

between

di verse

national

vi ewpoi nts-..;-hi s

experience at the League of Nations had convinced him of the futility of this.
Instead, discussion was to take place

11

within the cadre of the Schuman Plan

idea, 11 with he, Monnet, acting as concert master from whom the others were to
take cues.48 This
diplomatic

failed

accomplishment,

to

happen.
the

Paris

Beginning at a
negotiations

summit of European
followed

a

tedious,
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meandering downh i 11 path only to get bogged down in swamps of bureaucratic
maneuvering in the national self-interest.
The

9

May

announcement

was

a

public

relations

coup

of

historic

proportions: the proposed heavy industry pool had not merely to do, according
to

the

Monnet-drafted· text whose

powerful · words

French

Foreign Minister ·

Schuman read squeakily into the radio microphone, wi~h the settlement of coal
and steel problems but with the prevention of future wars by building a new
Europe.

The message proved irresistible, at least outside of Britain.

In

agreeing to cede a measure of sovereignty as a condition of entering the Paris
negotiations, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg all took a step
from which there could be no retreat, whatever the.practical failures.
would be legion.

These

By the end of Summer 1950 at·the latest it was evident that -

Monnet 1 s plans for a Western European coal-steel pool were in tatters.
This _is because the document de travail, the French blueprint for the
proposed

new

negotiations.49

organization,

was

completely

unsuitable

as

a

basis

for

It reflects not ~nly an-obsession with the Ruhr Problem but a

complete· failure to take account of the interests of the other negotiating
parties: while demanding that they cede sovereign powers to a proposed High
Authority, Monnet failed to provide adequate restraints on their use.
yet, this transfer was to occur in the name of

a

11

Worse

greater good, 11 which it was

politically difficult to oppose, thus compounding fears of interventionism
with those of demagogy.

The concerns of the negotiating parties were not

unreasonable.
The proposed new organization, the High Authority, was to take the form
·of a board of directors dominated by its chairman and subject to the minimal
institutional restraints of a court of appeal and a kind of parliament with
power only to interpellate.

Three separate committees compose9 of producers,
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consumers, and labor w~re to advise the High Authority upon request and new
regi anal organi zati ans of producers were to provide the High Authority with
i rtformati on and carry out its orders.

Article 19 defines the powers to be.

assigned the High Authority by the governments of the negotiating parties.
These are to include·whatever is necessary either to create a
(marche unique)

11

or

pool -production. 11

11

special market 11

Thus the High Authority is to be
11

empowered to direct the elimination of

all privileges of exit or entry, tax

equivalents, and all quantitative restriction~ on the circulation of coal and
steel

within

the

area

subventions or aids

to

of

the member

industry, 11

11

states. 11

all

means

This would

include

11

all

of differentiation between

foreign and domestic markets in transportation rates as well as coal and steel
11

prices;'' and all

restrictive practices. 11

Article 17 describes the principles guiding the implementation of this
vast array of new powers. - These were exalted yet vague
contradictory.

Whatever was meant,

Authority the power to assure

11

first of all,

identical

and frequently

by assigning the High

delivery conditions for coal

steel at the poi-nt of departure from mine or mill ? 11

and

Were the same coal and -

steel prices to obtain throughout the community in spite of different cost
structures?
11

How,

secondly,

was

the

High

Authority

to

eliminate

the

falsification 11 of competititive cond-itions, which no two sellers in the same

market and certainly no two governments, could possibly· have been able to
define in the same way?

And how was the

11

equalization of work conditions and

wages 11 to be achieved without catastrophic inflation?
might materialize from the provision for a proposed

11

What evils, finally,
transitiona] period 11 of

unspecified length during which- the High Authority need not be bound by the
above guidelines?
The articles dealing with the specifics of prices, wages, production,-
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investment, and rules of competition were even less reassuring.

It was quite

literally anyone's guess as to how the High Authority would achieve the noble
goals of price policy, as outlined in Article 25.
of

consumers

against

practices, the

11

discrimination

and

of

These were the protection

producers

11

against

disloyal

11

assurance 11 of steady expansion of markets and outputs, and the

creation of conditions
the highest level

11

guaranteei ng the spontaneous allocation of output at

of productivity."

As for the wage policy described in

Article 26, the High Authority promised to forbid all reductions as a means of
adjusting to slumps, eliminate competition when this · 11 exploits 11 labor, and
"guarantee coal and steel workers the highest standard of living compatible
The High Authority further pl edged itse l f to

with -economic equilibrium."
introducing
production.

--

measures
None

aimed. at

of· this

made

"wage
much

equal ity 11
sense.

To

through
believe

assessments
that

_the

on
High

Authority, on its own, could guarantee the steady expansion of markets and
outputs needed to rais~ wages,and to red~ce prices simultaneously required a
bounding leap of faith.
And

articles

28

through

30 ·hinted

ominously

appropriation of power at the expense of producers.

at

a

far-reaching

The H1gh Authority was to

be authoriz.ed to impose manufacturirig programs on firms, steer investments,
recommend changes in customs duties, banking rules, and transportation duties,
and fine wrongdoing producers.
On 8 August 1950 the German foreign office representative to the Paris
negoti ati ans

reported

that

11
•••

the

French

document de travail

has· become

9utmoded in every single point as a result of the recent negotiations and
remains only of historical

value. 11 50 This was only a slight exaggeration.

Over the next two years, even months after the - Treaty of Paris had been
concluded, .the Dutch, Belgians, Luxemburgers and Italians would combine with
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the Germans not to eliminate the coal~steel

pool

but to make it work.

Parallel to thi$, producers would. resume cartel-like discussions in order to
secure their influence within the new European Coal and Steel Community which,
although traces _of its origins in the document de travail ,are detectable,
would bear the stamp not so much of Monnet I s ideas and methods as of German,
and West European, industrial tradition.
Initial German· reactions to the 9 May Schuman Pl an announcement were n·ot
necessarily those of surprise and astonishment.

Minister for the Marshall

Pl an Karl Albrecht sent out a circular on the fifteenth of the month to the
effect that

11
•••

the proposition of the French Foreign Minister was anything

but .spontaneous and certainly the product -of long-term planning. 11

It noted

that Schuman had expressed similar ideas _for Franco-German cooperation at
their earlier meeting, then as at present emphasizing the need for
conditions II

especially as

regards manufacturing costs,

11

11

equal

harmoni zation of

outputs, 11 and market sharing.51
The Schuman Plan proposal

also came as - no surprise to the business

manager of the steel producers I association, the Stahl verei ni gung.
response was· anything but evidence of a new

11

European spirit. 11

His wary
The 9 M·ay

radio announcement, as he described it, was full of l andmi nes: its
protection 11

provisions

a pretext for

low-grade French ore, the

11

forcing. the

11

equa l

Ruhr to consume more

double pricing 11 ban both an excuse for imposing

uneconomical increases in Ruhr energy costs and a lever with which to pry
scarce scrap out of the Ruhr at artificially low prices.
11

Still worse, the

common production 11 spoken of by Schuman could be invoked to suppress

gre.ater dynamism which,
_comparison to. the French. 11

11

the

even after World War II our works manifest by
Concretely, this would mean denial of permission

to construct a continuous wide-strip rolling mi 11 in the Ruhr on the grounds
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that France would soon dispose of two such uni ts and Belgium and Luxembourg
one apiece.52

The document nonetheless concludes on a stron~ positive note of

support for the 9 May announcement.
freight

rates or prices . be

· producer agreements?

11

How,

equali zed 11

its

author asks,

except by means

could either

of international

It was. quite unnecessary to draw the obvious conclusion:

if the Americans wanted to have a workable coal and steel community in Western
Europe, they would have to be prepared to countenance the restoration, in o~e
· form

or

other,

of

the

international

steel

cartel

and

its ·ancillary

arrangements in coal.
This fact, together with a belief that time worked on Germany's side,
governed the Federal .Republic's conduct of the Paris negotiations.

The chief

negotiator, Walter Hallstein, was to be placatory: kow-tow to the Schuman Plan
idea, let the secondary coal-steel powers do most of the talking, and not
press any point that might jeopardize the proceedings~ Adenauer and Monnet
incidentally having already agreed in May to exclude issues arising from the
occupation from discussions

surrounding the ·coal-steel

pool. 53

shape and scope of the future heavy industry authority,

As to the

the Germans were

guided by the idea, put rather inelegantly by the business manager of the
Stahl verei ni gu_ng, that

11

The more we succeed in organizing economic support

structures, the greater will be the .chances of the [Schuman Plan's] political
realization.

At the same time, political hopes will be dashed if the coal and

steel union is not properly constructed or is overly ambitious. 11 54

In a word:

he wanted to immobilize any Monnet-headed coal-steel directorate and set up an
-organization that could be dominated by industry.

Thus,

he •suggests,

a

college of industrialists should be empowered to run·· the new. High Authority,
which would become executor rather

than

formulator of policy,

supervision of the participating governments.

under the

An organization so constituted,
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he concludes, would be a worthy successor to the, I.nternational Steel Cartels
of 1926 and 1933.
This by no means represented the views of only the smoke-stack barons:
there

existed

govermrie_nt

a

solidarity

which,

by

the

of

time

fact
the

between
Schuman

industry,
Pl an

ministries,

negotiations

had

and
been

· concluded, embraced the coal and steel unions and muc~ of social democracy as
well---a situation very un.like the one in France.
was not always evident.

This similarity of views

Germany was still under occupation: any mention of

cartels was taboo and all assertions of national interest, however legitimate,
had

to

be muted.

It \'.las

in

the

nature

Hallstein 1 s

of

intermediary with the Fr!:!nch to speak from time to time
lest negotiations collaps·e.

11

task

as

chief

with forked tongue 11

Adenauer had to do this too---

make public

commitments to imposing. economic policies harmful to Ruhr· interests that he
never intended to keep.

He could act without being embarrassed thanks to a

knack for maintaining an olympian distance from the hard, and often nasty,
el bowing for advantage that increasingli dominated coal -steel

discussions:

this put him in a position to plead ignorance to unpleasant developments
without being dishonest.

Adenauer was largely

11

in the· dark 11 about'the Paris

proceedings.· On 31 June 1951, lo.ng after the formal governmental sessions. had
been concluded but while ministerial-level di'scussi.ons ~ere still under way,
he worriedly inquired of Mini~ter of Economics Erhard whether it might still
not be too late to organize a delegation

11
•••

as exceptionally well~trained as

the [men of] the French Pl an, which works rel entl e·ssly on the Schuman Pl an
negotiations. 11 55
free

Tinged with bitter irony since Adenauer distrusted Erhard 1 s

market views

and had deliberately given

him

no

role

in

the

Paris

negotiations·, the Minister of Economics• reply included a lengthy description
of the huge, cumbersome, but powerful institutional machinery that had been
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grinding out policy for the coal-steel pool over the past yea~.

Firs~ of all,

Erhard said, a special Schuman Plan Desk (Schuman Plan Referat). had been set
up in his ministry,_which received support from the Ministry of Transport, the
Iron and Steel Office (Fachstelle Eisen und Stahl), and the Foreign Office
(Auswarti.ges Amt).

Scarcely veiling a sneer, he elaborated th~t "In iron and

steel ·there is a Wi rtschaftsverei ni gung 11 ---as if Adenauer had never heard of
such a thi ng--- 11 wi th a powerful statistical section of 250 persons.
current output and sales
disposal.

The

data

coordination

Fachstelle Eisen und Stahl

is

for all

producing

between

it

and

working

well.

nations·· and

our

ministry

Dr.

Mondon,

similarly

connected

(DKBL),

KohJenbergbauleitung
section. 11 56
policy-making,.

with

Erhard
for

might

the

coal

which

has

have

through

its

excellent

still

mentioned

instance - the

(Koordinierungsausschuss) ·to which

industry
own

active

belonged

a

is

through

the

Our Ministry
Deutsche

the

further

"Coordinating
wide

at our

a -we 11 -known

. industrialist, heads the Fachstell e and is -al so a steel trustee.
is

It keeps

statistical
layers

of

Coinmittee 11

variety· of

prominent

economic figures such as the banker Hermann Abs, Kl ockner managing di rector
Henle, the leading German industrial statistician Dr. Rolf Wagenfilhr~ General
Director Dr. Wilhelm Roelen, the SPD economist and party leader Dr. Ernst
Nolting,

and many other.s.

It directed sever~l

subcommittees composed of

equally prominent representatives organized to deal
policy,

iron

and

steel,

and

coal •.. Constellations

with wages and social
of

academic

advisory

committees surrounded these powerful bodies.57
Although not a real

equivalent to the cons ti tuti anal

French provided in the form of the- document de travail,

draft which the
the basic ·German

working paper for the first session of Paris conference, which opened on 20
June, contains the outline of an alternative scheme.

Its first component was
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a High Authority too weak to interfere with either the restoration of the Ruhr
or its traditional methods of operation and position in West European heavy
The High Authority I s powers were to be hemmed in. by a Counci 1 of

industry.

Ministers (which the Dutch had by then al ready proposed), a High Court with
broad powers of review,
committees of its own.

and a General

Asiembly able

to

set

up

special

Further, the High Authority 1 s social responsibilities

as outlined in Article 17 of the French draft---commitments to maintain full
employment and equalize wages---were to be dropped,

and the principle of

promoting maximum economic efficiency to serve as first maxim of policy.

Yet

even in this respect the High Authority 1 s powers were to be sharply curtailed.
It was to be forbidden to set prices and establish manufacturing programs and
· allowed to engage -in long-term production planning on the sole condition that
11

projects built in the wrong places 11

recent new

(meaning outside of the

Federal· Republic) be subjected to compulsory review.

The High Authority 1 s

power to finance new investments w~s also to be n~rrowly circumscribed, that
to enforce terms of

11

fair competition 11 not formally abolished but legally and

bureaucratically reduced to innocuousness.58
The German paper, secondly, assigns the powers stripped from the High
Authority to producer associations without overtly mentioning the dicey matter
of cartels.

The French document, fo. calling for the organization of

groups, 11 inadve·rteritly provided an opening that made this possible.

11

regi onal
Monnet,

who intended that they serve mainly as transmission belts for High Authority
directives,_ was

deliberately

vague

about

their

composition,

apart

ffom

specifying that they should be set up on a transnational basis, a stipulation
included

to

threaten

the

Ruhr

with

Franco-Bel go-Luxembourgeoi se bloc.
overlook this

possible danger,

the

formation

of

a

more

The German working" paper,

powerful

choosing

to

speciously accej)ts the French proposal

in
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principle while introducing its own very different specific wording to the
effect that the groups be "created on a geographical basis without regard to
national frontiers."
economics

The German_s, in other words, assigned primacy to the

of locat1on,. which

favored

federalization as intended by Monnet.

them,

rather than

the

politics

of

They also went into far greater detail

than he in describing the legal character, organization, and responsibilities.
of the regional groups.

They were, first of all, not tQ be purely private

associations which could be attacked as being cartels but semi-official bodies
(6ffentlich-rechtlicher K6rperschafteri)

which,

while· self-go~erning,

discharge responsibilites on behalf of the coal-steel pool.
finally,

opposes

outright

any

division

of

the

Ruhr

would

The German paper,
into

two

or

more

subdivisions---which the French were known to have in mind---as this would, it
emphasizes,. destroy· a model

of

technical

efficiency,

prevent large·-scale

rationalization of plant; and impair the operation of numerous scientific and
technical coal and steel organizations.59
Neither the French nor the Germans seriously expected to harmonize their
discordant designs for the ECsc·at the Paris.negotiations but hoped instead,
e.ach for reasons of their . own, to obscure them in tangles of abstruse and
convoluted

Euro-verbiage.

Adenauer's

overriding

aim

was

occupation.

He welcomed all diversions from memories of the war, certain ·that·

time, history, and even nature itself were on Germany's side.
to commit the Federal

Republic

in the

to

end

the

Monnet wanted

name of Eur·ope to an arrangement·

concerning the Ruhr which he, and he alonej

could control.

His opening

remarks to the heads of delegation on 20 June .hinted as much: the· marche
unique free of barriers to commerce in coal and steel was, he emphasized, to
be regarded only. as an ultimate goal; until then "transitional arrangements"
would prevail. 60

Through them, he hoped, the Ruhr would ·pass from control of
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the occupation governments to that of the ECSC.
The Belgian coal deal~ the most important diplomatic accomplishment of
the summer months,· provides a measure of the vast gap existing between the
high purposes enumerated in the document de travail and the grubby realities
of the

politics ·of national

self-interest.

Belgian_ steel_ producers, who

controlled the nation 1 s mines, were hostilely indifferent to the 9 May 1950
proposal: high-cost exporters, they hoped to lock in gains made in the late
1940s at the .expense of the Ruhr by means of new cartel arrangements limiting
future German foreign sales.

Though too weak to stay out of the Schuman Plan

negotiations, as the price for remaining in them the Belgians demanded a
tonnage subsidy on coal output - to be paid by ·low-cost mines ---meaning the
Ruhr---to their own inefficient ones.
grounds. that·· the
unspecified

pits•

geological

sorry

Though the subsidy was justified on the

state

affliction,

stemmed

the

source

decades-long practice of profit-milking.

The

from

some· but

of

the

Belgians,

accursed

problem -was
whose

per

if
the

capita

income was by a substantia_l margin the highest of the Six, were financially
fully capable of solving problems created by their own mismanagement .. Why,
Bonn wondered, should we still poor G~rmans be called upon called to foot the
bi 11?

If geological disadvantages were to be offset, should not compensation

be sought for the low-grade Salzgitter ore fields put into opera ti on by the
former Hermann Goring Works?. In the end,

the Germans swallowed hard but

agreed to pay a levy of two percent on turnover---even though this meant
keeping a competitor in ~usine~s,

raising

steel costs
0

drai ni_ng profits from the mi nes---because they prefe rred a

in· the
11

Ruhr,

and

pr.i ce protection

arrangement 11 to be administered by existing Belgian and German _cartels to
possible futur·e High Authority intervention into the pricing field.61

Monnet

readily accepted this regulatory scheme- in order to keep the negotiations
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progressing and to weaken the Ruhr.

The fact that it violated most of the

principles set forth ·in the document de travail was evidently unimportant to
him by comparison.
Three' events of September 1950 forced the la tent Franco-German conflict
into the open, caus,ng the Paris negotiations, which all parties expected to·
arrive at an uneventful conclusion by October, to be prolonged another six
months.

On 21 September, first of all, Regulations I-II I, about which the

Germans had learned several

days earlier, were published to Law 27,

the

successor to the US-UK laws 56/75 governing decartelizatlon. · The new law
itself,

published back on 20 May 1950 after many months of re-drafting,

differed from its predecessor in one important respect; it made provision to
indemnify former holders of Ruhr assets.

Regulations I - -III destroyed the

illusion that, as McC]oy apparently had wished, such .restitution would quietly
set in motion a process of re-concentration: · they ordered the immediate break
up· of _the six largest Konzerne, a cut in ties between the coal
industries,

and

companies.62

the

organization

of

no

less

than

54

and steel

separate

mining

While the Ruhr tried to recover ·from this shock, the French were

sent reeling by a different one.

On 12 · September 1950 Secretary of State Dea_n

Acheson casually mentioned to Schuman at an informal

gathering of. foreign

ministers in New York that the United States was prepared to arm no less than
. ten West German di vi si ans, a number reduced to five when publicly announced
eight

days

later.

pronouncement
stroke.63

Was

The

threatened
this,

the

reduction
to

destroy
French

made

little

difference:

the

Paris

negotiations

at

public

would

ask,

the

where

Acheson's
a

single

European

initiative .named after their French Foreign -Minister was to lead---to a new
Wehrmacht stationed along the Rhine?

In order to save the Paris negotiations

Monnet declared by fiat on 28 September that the future High Authority would
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have, and indeed exercise, the power to break up cartels.64
news yet.

This was worse

Law 27 would lapse at the end· of the occupation: Monnet, in the

name of the High Authority, was asserting the right to forbid reconcentrati on
i ndefi ni tely.

II I

The critical phase in the coal-steel negotations was now to begin, and it
would not be over until
verged on coll apse.
Plan

by

shoving

March 1951, a peri ad of months during which they

US High Cammi ssi oner McCl oy even_tual Ty ·saved the Schuman

deconcentration

under Law

27

down Chancellor Adenauer 1 s

throat, but little of Monnet 1 s origin~l design c;:ould be salvaged.

The Treaty

of Paris, initial~d on 15 April 1951, settled only a few of the issues rai~ed
in the original French draft.

A so-called Interim Committee, German-dominated

and composed of ministerial bureaucrats, would design the structures and·work
out the operating procedures of the High Authority
between

the

treaty

signing

and

the June

Authority in its Luxembourg offices.

1952

itself in the months

i.nstall ati on

of

the

High

But the Ruhr Problem would largely be

solved in another manner---through a new social compact binding Germ~n coal
and steel to the unions and- the rest pf industry and through a new alliance
structure

governing

Western

European

producers.

These

grew

out

of

the

succession of confrontations that began in October.
The ·Germans
·prepared for it.

fired· the

opening

salv~.

After listening with

11

The

visible

French

should have

been

satisfaction 11 to McCloy 1 s

report on the results of the New York foreign ministers I conference, where
Schuman

had been

forced to accept arming

the Federal

Republic,

Adenauer

informed the assembled High Commissioners with uncharacteristic bluntness that.
the regi.Jl ati ons just published to Law 27 jeopardized the success of the
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Schuman Plan and might necessitate the recall of the German delegation from
Paris.65

The threat was no~ taken serious·ly.

Nor was the resignation a few

days later of managing di rector Paul· Reusch of GutehoffnungshUtte from an
important Schuman Pl an coordinating committee, apparently si nee his personal
assertiveness was known to have made him unpopular in the Ruhr.66

Robert

1

Lehr s speech to the "Munich .Exptirt Club" on the first of the month provided
the first unm·i stakabl e evidence · of a new Ruhr toughness.

It was from the

French standpoint troublesome enough that the speech was widely-publicized,
but worse yet that Lehr, as Minister of the

Interior-designate, could be

presumed to have spoken on behalf of the government.
could

no

longer accept

the

11.1 million

ton

level

Germany, Lehr said,
of

authorized

steel

production sti 11 formally in effect---thi s must be immediately raised to a
minimum·· of

16

million

tons,

dependence .on the Allies.

the

alternative

being

continued

economic

Future European industrial growth, he emphasized,

must be allowed to occur naturally, in the Ruhr, which enjoyed the best factor
.endowment, regardless .of whether this would mean curtailing French ·investment
plans.

Lehr asserted that Germany would not all ow the French to use the

Schuman Plan as a means to perpetuate their temporary, war-gained industrial
advantage,

"recommendingll

that

complementary to the Ruhr.

they

specialize

in - lines

of

production

Apart from the desirability of resuscitating the

1926 agreement, which Lehr 1 s speech broadly hinted at, he later privately
revived

the

idea" ••• of. an

association

between

French

and

German

heavy

industry, anchored in share exchanges ..• like those proposed a year or so ago
by the Vereinigte Stahlwerke."67
In

early

Novemper

implementing Law 27.

the

Federal

Republic

announced

its

proposal - for

Distilled from the many planning exercises of the

trustee ·organizations for coal and steel, this did not come even remotely
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close

to

accommodating

American

or

French

decartelization

policy.

The

operating principles of the German plan, wrote Adenauer to Mccloy on the third
of the month, were to preserve the coal-steel tie to :the extent necessary to
make the mills self-sufficient in coke and as required to deal with the
problem of selling low-grade fuel; to introduce organizational changes only
when strictly necessary; and to get over the whole business as quickly as
possible.68

An Adenauer memorandum of the following day spelled out the

reorganization in more specific terms.

In coal, first of all,

associations 11 ---meaning cartels--- tould be allowed,

new mining

"regional
companies

should be so organized as to b_e efficient and competitive, and the "technical _
and economic"

ti es between the. pi ts and the steel , · chemical ,

energy and

,

transportation industries must be
that

big

Ruhr

· Gel senki rchen,
· . properties.

mills

in

Boch um,
In

the

II

,

given consideration ,'1 by which was meant

localities

of

Duisburg-Hamborn,

Oberhausen,·

and Dortmund ought be all owed to keep their coal
iron

and

steel,

nine

companies 11

"core

(Stahlkerngesellschaften) set up under Law 56/75 were to remain in being,
another seventeen

specialized, mainly non-Ruhr

factories were to be left

alone, and a third group of six producers wriuld be dealt with later by the
Federal Government in collaboration with the industry itself.
large

units

and

included

the

most

important

single

These were all
Ruhr

mill,

the

August-Thyssen-Hutte in Duisburg~Hamborn.69
In the first week of November Monnet retaliated with a declaration of
total war against cartels, demanding both new proposals to implement Law 27
and the inclusion of guarantees against their revival in the treaty draft.70
He also injected the United States, whose role up to this point had been to
cast benedictions over the Schuman Plan idea, directly into the coal-steel
pool

negotiations.

Monnet could count on

powerful

backing

from

the· US
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Ambassador in France David Bruce, to whose staff he succeeded in ha.vi ng
attached a young Treasury Official named

11

Tommy 11 Tomlinson, a man totally

.devoted to him personally, as well as from McCl oy to whom he managed to have
seconded from Harvard Law Schriol another devoted follower, Professor Robert
BoWi e.

On

20

November

1950

the

chief

German

delegate

at

the

Paris

negotiations, Walter Hallstein, was summoned to the offices o_f the Fren.ch Plan
on ·the Rue Martignac to be given a foretaste of the rough treatment that could
be expected_ to result from German recalcitrance on the cartel

question.

Springing to the attack, Monnet I s young American staffmen rudely reminded
Hallstein that the Federal Government labored unde~ an illusion if it imagined
11

that ·the

launching of the Schuman Plan would automatically entail

irrmediate end to [Allied economic] controls.

the

Ameri~an opinion [one of them

went on] was not afraid to jump in the water,_ but hardly would do so without
holding on to a lifejac~et. 11 71 ·IRA, the Office of Military Security, the
control

groups---

the

entire

economically

repressive

apparatus

of

the

occupation---would, ·Monnet chimed in, keep operating until the Ruhr Problem
was solved.
By Christmas -Monnet had decided to write off the entire idea -of -a
co~l-steel pool unless the Germans agreed to genuine decartelization, and he
so informed Schuman on the twenty-second.72

At the same time he had reason to

think that such a drasti.c step might not be necessary.
reported reaching "fundamental

On 19 December he

agreement" with the US over the four main

decartelization issues: Law 27 not mer~ly required deconcentration but forbade
re-concentration by means of financial mani pul ati on; the High Commissioners 1
steel plan, which called for the break up of large production units, was fair;
a centralized coal-selling syndicate was inconsistent with the Schuman Pl an
and must be phased out; and coal-steel ties were to be allowed only in a few

35

cases. 73

Al though over ti me this unanimHy would prove to be more apparent

than real , as a result of the· pact both McCl oy and his deputy Bowie agreed to
"take the initiative" in discussing Law 27 with the Germans: not only would
the .immense power of the United States now be brought to bear against the
Federal· Republic but Monnet himself, while pulling strings from behind .the
scenes, could pretend to be• above the battle.
another . simultaneuous

campaign

more

This enabled him to wage

effectively,

the

one

over

the

decartelization and deconcentration pr.ovisions (Articles 60 and 61) of the
treaty draft.
Why did the United Stat~s _ intervene. at this point and in this mann·er?
Although the Germans were convinced to a man that they had once again fallen
victim to American
regarding

11

cartelphobia, 11

they

were wrong.

deconcentration policy had not· changed.

McCloy 1 s

skepticism

In· any case, McCloy 1 s

deputy Bowie, as well as ·Tomlinson iri Paris, really worked for Monnet, who in
insta~ce aft~r instance quite literally dictated negotiating strategies over
the telephone, which they in turn represented as being American policy to the
Germans seated across the table.74

Their• willingness to act as Monnet's -

vehicle was not due to a naive belief that together, Americans and Frenchmen,
could banish the evils of collusion and conspiracy from the industrial economy
of Europe.

Tommy Tomlinson I s

11

0bservati ons. on the Treaty, 11 penned in November

1950, are full of doubt concerning the nature ~f the emerging coal-steel pool.
Tomlinson did not like the way the Belgian coal problem was being solved,
wanted to restrict the High -Authority I s use of powers of intervention to
"exceptional circumstances, 11 was worried lest it become a device for stripping
national governments of their power to regulate cartels, and did not think it
should be able to influence investment decisions.

He also could made ·no sense

of the French proposals for pricing policy, objected to assigning.the High
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Authority the power to set .production quotas during periods of emergency, and
felt that the provision in draft article 39 to assign the High Authority the
discretionary

power

to

distinguish

between

agreements would lend itself .to abuse.75

11

good 11

and

11

bad 11

restrictive

Evidently, Tomlinson, and doubtless

other key American policy-makers, were prepared to ·overlook the undesirable
economic.features of the proposed pool for

11

political reasons, 11 above all the

perceived imperative---fel t all the more acutely after the outbreak of the
Korean War---of building a sturdy-anti-communist bloc in Western Europe.
Schuman Pl an negoti ati ans were siinply too important to fail.

The

If Monnet.' s

price for keeping them alive was the punishment of the Ruhr for its historical
misdeeds, so be it, a~ least up to the point t~at this interfered with higher
considerations of policy.
11

In 1951 American policy would enter a phase of

Ruhr-bashing 11 which, though not explicitly diversionary, ·was never intended

to stifle the recovery of German heavy industry or block its restoration; this
was fine, so long as it passed more or less unnoticed.
If· Monnet

could

count

on

US

support · in

the

struggles

over

the

implementation of Law 27 and the drafting of artfcles 60 and 61, German heavy
industry was also acquiring allies for the impending showdown.
them

was

the

unions.

Prominent

in

the

coal

and

steel

The first of
trusteeship . ·

organizations set up by the British, they had for_years doggedly opposed the
restorati.on of the old Konzerne in a well-founded belief that this \1ould mean
the end of co-determination (Mitbestitnmung).

The central feature of their own

reorganization plans, for which they found very little official support except
among the British, was the transfer of the trusteeships' powers to the joint
control of the federal government, the unions, state authorities, and private·
shareholders.
rather •it

The Schuman Plan proposal brought_ no change i_n ·this respect:

s~bstantially

strengthened

labor's

position.

The

document de

37 ·

travail

made

provision for a one-:third union

representation on the High

Authority I s so-ca 11 ed advisory committees ( comi te"s consul tatif s) and Monnet
had suggested that this formula al so be carried over to the regional groups.
Thanks largely to him, representatives· of both coal and steel workers were
included on the German Paris. delegation as well.

In brief, the unions quite

reasonably regarded the planned coal-steel pool as a welcome extension into.
the

international

sphere

of

the

co-determination

principle whose

future

observation seemed doubtful in a Federal Republic run by the CDU.
Between the end of September and November 1950,

however,

the union

position chang~d dramatically as the r~sult of Monnet's declaration.of all out
war against the cartels.
book

examining

industry," ••• the

the

11

0n 27 October, 11 concludes the au.thor of a recent

origins

leadership

of

of ·the

co-determination
national

union

in

German

association

heavy

(Deutsche

Gerwerkschaftsbl.ind) decided to endorse the concept of [ reorganization] based
on the maintenance of the coal-steel tie which had been worked out by the
trustee organizations •.• ,-the old trusts, and the ·Federal Government, on the
condition of a satisfactory settlement on the co-determination question. "76
German coal

and steel

industrialists,

recognizing almost at once that a

definitive - shift in union attitudes had occurred, now knew that they could
c6~nt on DGB support in the looming confrontation with th~ French.
did

not

encourage

a

employers refused all

readiness · to

reach

agreement

concessions for months until

on

Yet this

co-determination:

given an ultimatum by

Adenauer who feared a withdrawal of union ~upport for the Schuman Plan.77

The

famous Co-Determination Law ( Mi tbestimmungsgesetz) for coal

was

and steel

passed on_ 10 April 1951, five days before the initialing of the Treaty of
Paris.
The Ruhr pi eked up foreign support at the sessions of the heads of
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delegations, which resumed in October 1950.

These dealt with

a number- of

issues left unresolved or deliberately avoided over the summer because their outcome turned on th~ cartel problem.
reason

for

optimism:

the

coal

Regarding the _latter, -the Germans had

and

steel

industries

of

each

of

the

participating nations, France included, were thoroughly regulated by private
interests
contrary

acting

with

legal

notwi,thstanding,

government I s destroying,

sanction.

there
or even

could

Expedient
be

no

pronouncements

question

of

any

to

the

national

tampering, with these arrangements.

In

Fall, it was the minor coal-steel powers, not the Ruhr, which openly defied
Monnet on the cartel question.78

Eventually, he- would have to beg Hallstein

to bri.ng them back into line.

The solidarity of the non-French had two

further related consequences as well: the

11

advisory committees 11 were reduced

from. three bodies representing the interests of producers, consumers, and
labor respectively to a single body dominated by heavy i hdustry. · Labor
delegates · were to be chosen only from the coal
11

and steel

industries· and

consumers, 11 defined as consuming industries, to represent tied-in interests

such as manufacturers, gas distributors~ and electrical utilities as well as
big• customers s~ch as the chemical and elecirital equipment industfies.

After

months of complete French failure to make headway, another important component
of Monnet 1 s overall design, the regional groups, was simply dropped from.the
treaty, their role and composition being left thereafter to. the determination
of the national governments.
T~e West-European coalesence at the ministerial level was paralleled at
the private level as well.

11

In early December, 11 reported Theodore H. White,

then the head of a struggling wire-service agency in Paiis,
major industrial
business.

11

meetings of the

cartels were quietly held with representatives of German

The fruit of these meetings was a secret memorandum by the cartels,

I

39

delivered to each government, in which the Schuman Pl an was denounced with
vague but ominous threat of political reprisals. 11 79
entit1ed

11

The document in question,

Les Federations industrielles de l 1Europe de. l 10uest et le Plan

Schuman," first drculated in early January 1951.

It makes the customary

obeisances to the Schuman Plan Idea but warns that Monnet 1s

11

super-statist 11

·designs will cause economic stagnation, decrease production, and wreck chances
for economic integration.

It also demands a larger role for industry in the

negotiations, as well as the creation of a body with the power to overr.ide the
High
11
·

••

Authority,

insisting

that

the

latter

not

be

allowed

to

become

·~mistress of the management and destiny of enterprises falling under its

j uri sdi cti on. 11 80

Thi s---the

first

si gni fi cant agreement

between

Europe I s ·

national producer associations since World War II---was·a giant step towards
Germany I s

return

to

international

happened surprisingly early.

respectability.

Thanks

to Monnet,

it

In any case, the emergence of this consensus of

businessmen greatly strengthened the hand of the Federal Republic in dealing
with the Franco-Americans.
On 2 January 1951 the Germans tipped.their hand.
Monnef, Hall stein

11

In a personal letter to

recommended" that the best way out of the impasse would be

for the Federal Republic to sign the coal -steel treaty wj thout the propo·sed .
articles

60. and 61,

leaving

the

settlement. of. the

deconcentration

and

decarteliiation issues up to the High Authority. A couple-of days later Robert
Pferdmenges, a figure reputedly sympathetic to French concerns, bore the same
message to Leroy-Beaulieu; the chief economic advisor to High Commissioner
Shortly thereafter Adenauer himself, i nimi tabl y bumbling
11
brought the proposal to Leroy-Beaulieu 1s attention.
The

Fran~oi s-Ponc_et.82
yet

shrewd,

• Chancellor, 11

noted his French

interlocutor,.

11

appeared to be only vaguely

familiar with the problems raised by the decartelizati.on question as well as
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its connection with the Schuman Plan,

11

and seemed to think that while the

French were worried mainly about the maintenance of coal-steel ties, only the
Americans really intended to eliminate the Deutsche Kohlen Verkauf, the
central coal distribution agency.83. If.Aderrauer ~as dropping a hint here that
the Germans were prepared to give in to the Americans on the issue of
coal-steel ties if allowed to deal directly with the French on the matter of
coal

distribution,

Leroy-Beaulieu

appears

not·

to

have

caught

it.

Leroy-Beaulieu did, however, worriedly note that in closing the discussion
with a warninri that German public opinion was

11

unanimously behind the

preservation of DKV, the unions as well as the industrialists

11

Adenauer

appeared to be in no mood to give in.
Hallstein's

initiative

resulted

from

a

12

December

1950

cabinet

endorsement of a negotfating strategy developed in the the Ministry of
Economics.

Although there was, Erhard said, no remaining doubt that the

Americans, if allowed to act on their own, would demand .the break up· of the
DKV, he added encouragingly that

11
•••

it will be possible to stretch out the

process of winding down the liquidation of the coal wholesaling agencies
(Kohlenverkaufskontore) to three to five years and to imagine that over such a
period condit.ions

and viewpoints. will

meantime. he expected lasting coal

change

significantly. 84
11

In

the

shortages that would require continued

centralized allocation through a DKV-like organization," as was the case in
France, Belgium, and elsewhere.

Franco-American intransigence on Law .27,

Erhard stressed, made it all the more essential that the Schuman Plan be put
into operation as soon as possible.
adequate

and the word fairness

The treaty proposal was· still far from
(Gleichberechtigung),

Erhard complained,

almost never spoken in Paris: it was bad e~ough that the proposed text did not
specify that the heavy industry pool would supercede all Allied-imposed
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controls on coal and steel, worse still that-it continued to include numerous
discriminatory provi-sions.

Yet Erh·ard thought that their el imi nation, though

desirable, was not essential: German economic structures and methods were
similar to those in the rest of Western Europe, the n~n~French delegatibns in
Paris agreed on most essential points, and Monnet lacked support in France.
There being good reason to be skeptical of his power to discriminate against
the Ruhr, he concluded, the best thing was tostay the course.
The confidence of Ruhr industry was swelling as well.
wrote

his

coJleague

Lehr,

who

had

been

Interior, that it was now time to demand

recently
11

On 3 November Sohl

named .Minister

of

the

equal i ty of treatment, 11 an end to

controls and di scrimi nation~ and permission to build a continuous wide-strip
rolling

mill

as

conditions

for

entering

twenty-fourth of the month Sohl

the

coal-steel

pool.

On

the

informed him that on behalf of a tight ·

coalition consisting of the steel industry, its trusteeship organization, arid
the union he was ready to exert pressure on the Federal Government to give
11

priority to the construction of a

super-mill11 for ATH.86

· won Bonn's political and financial

On the thirtieth he

support for the acquisition of one such

plant, which had originally been built in the United States for a Czech buyer
but since had been first embargoed, then purchased for re-sale by a large
French

trading

company.

Sohl

was

optimistic

that - American

and

Bri_tish

objections could now be overcome merely by promising to export ·its scarce
product to ttie UK.82

By the end of January 1951 he was planning to enter

discussions concerning the acquisition of the Czech mill with understandably
upset representatives of French _steel , who had up to then reckoned with an
absence of German export competition

in the critical

growing market for

flat-rolled products until 1956.88
Monnet's strategy in response to this apparently ineluctable shift o'f
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odds

in

Germany's

favor

was

anything

but

simple • . First,

he

attacked,

threatening to wreck the Paris negotiations by resigning unless the German
proposal to drop Articles 60 and 61 from the treaty was immediately buried.
Fore·; gn Minister Schuman received a letter .to this effect on 22 January
, ..

1951.89

A week later Hallstein received a "personal note" containing the same

threat, but adding an amazing stipulation: ·it was not enough for the Germans
themselves

to

adopt

the

French

proposal

for

the

decartelization

and

deconcentration· provisions; they must al so rally the other del egati on_s around
it.90

The success of the Schuman Plan, in other words, was to hinge on the

German enlistment of Belgian, Dutch, Luxembourgeoise, and Italian support for
French policy directed against the Ruhr!
At the same time, Monnet tried to cover his rear by working out a deal
In his remarks to Leroy-Beaulieu on 17 January 1951 Adenauer

with. the DKV.

had alluded to German awareness of a fundamental Franco-American difference of
opinion

over

decarte 1 i za ti on

and

It

deconcentrati on.

indeed

existed.

Deconcentration had little meaning in the land of US Steel, General Motors and
Du Pont, but restr_aint of trade through interference with the laws of supply
and de~ani did.
of

production

The main concern of US polici was neither
units

nor

to cut the

coal-steel

tie

io

but

reduce the size
to ·destroy

the

particular organization through which, it was believed, they could exercise
coordinated control
Verkauf (DKV).

over

the marketplace.

This• was

the Deutsche Kohlen

For their part; the French wanted to appropriate a portion of

the Ruhr coal supply, cared not a whit about whether cartels were inherently
good or evil, and feared that the exercise of control over mine output would
be impossible if, as the Americans desired, the central coal allocation agency
were

taken

apart.

Among

Frenchmen,

only

Monnet

supported

the

American

position, all the while complaining bitterly not only that the Lorraine steel
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industry was undercutting him from behind the scenes but that French officials
gave him no better than lukewarm support.91 ·on 20 January Monnet met with the
DKV I s Ernst Russel, the foreign trade representative of the old Ruhr coal
cartel, in an attempt to get a German supply commitment to the Eastern French
11

mills

0n the basis of a favorable terms of reference. 11 92

.

On 14 February such

.

an agreement was privately arrived at, assuring Monnet of an adequate coal
supply and the Germans that, at least for the time being, the DKV machinery
would not be disassembled.93
The Americans were responsible for executing Monnet's main thrust against
the. Ruhr, and _McCloy delivered it personally on 2 March in the -form of an·
ultimatum to Adenauer.

He began with a · scolding reminder that the Federal

Republic's failure to present an adequate-decarteliza.tion schedule had delayed
the conclusion of the Schuman Pl an treaty for over two months, leaving no
doubt that to his mind Ruhr industry, which had allied with cartelists
throughout Europe and seduced the German unions, was the real culprit.

In

order to save the Schuman Pl an, McCl oy pressed ·on, the United States and
France had decided to impose their own decartel i zati on scheme on the Ruhr,
implying that it was in the best interests of the Federal Government to
endorse this lest its authority be weakened by the direct intervention of the
occupation powers. 94

On 4 March McCl oy dictated terms to the Bundeskanzl er:

the Deutsche Kohlen Verkauf was to be taken apart by 1 October

1952;

twenty-four new steel companies were to be formed; and the coal-steel tie was
to

be

limited

to

eleven

companies,

three-quarters of their own fuel supply.
accepted these terms. 95

none

of which

could control

over

On 14 March 1951 Adenauer formally

A month later, on 15 April , the representatives of

France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy initialed the
Treaty of Paris creating a European Coal and Steel Community among whose
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primary · tasks

was

decartelization

and

to

be

the· implemention

deconcentration

measures

and

enforcement

ordered

by

the

of

the

Allied

High

Commission under Law 27.

IV
Monnet had not finally won his battle against the Ruhr but lost it.
another two years~--until
steel---the French control

the opening of the common markets
boards,

their

activities

in coal

secretly directed

For
and
by

Monnet from the Rue de Mari gnac, waged a bitter struggle to enforce Law 27 on
the terms agreed to by Adenauer.

As President of the High Authority, Monnet

continued the campaign, this time openly if indirectly under treaty a·rticl es
65 and 66 (60 and 61 in draft).

But when Monnet for still •mysterious reasons

resigned as the head of the .coal-steel community in December 1953, he had next
to nothing to show for the months and months of strenuous exertion.

It was

not m~rely that the old cartels and trusts were obviously being reconstituted:
the

Ruhr

itself had been

restored as

the center of industrial

power in

Germany, and the Federal Republic, not France, had become the new ecoriomi c
axis of Western Europe.
The French bid failed partly because the Americans were not prepared to
let decartel i zation and deconcentrati on jeopardize German remarmament; in the
same month that MtCloy force-fed Adenauer the terms of settlement under Law 27
he directed Ruhr coal and steel to administer a scheme of import and export
controls in the name of European security, thus providing an indefinite stay
of execution fo.r the industry-run regulatory machinery.

The United States was

also commited to restoring Ruhr industry to private ownership, and so long as
the

principle

of

restitution

was

respected

only

a

thin

p~p~r .wall

occupation ordinances could hinder a re~grouping of traditional

of

interests.
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With the contractual accords of May 1952, which reduced the powers of the High·
Commissioners to insignificance, these disappeared.
As for the French, their determination to dismember the great .German
heavy industry complex al so became increasingly questionable.
interrupting the coal

it took .months

supply,

for

them to

For fear of
agree

upon

a

satisfactory plan for the breakup of DKV. As for enforcing it, as well as the
other provisions of the anti-concentration policy, the French delegates on the
coal

and steel

control

boards, who over a period of months administered

countless tongue-lashings .to the. still
appear

to

have

acted without

the

outwardly submissive Germans,. both

inner conviction

ingredient of success in unpleasant confrontations.

that

is

a

necessary

Upon taking office the

coal delegate, Parisot, actually filed a note to the effect that his mission
was foredoomed to failure, for which Monnet rebuked him sharply.96· His steel
counterpart;
practices,

Bureau,
would

though

later

eloquent

represent

in

the

denouncing . unfair
,:-·

ma,tres de forge

at

German

trade

international

producer gatherings.
But Mo~net 1 s bid fail~d mainly because the reaction against it bolstered
the

position

of

_German

heavy

industry

in

ways

which,

though

sometimes

unpredictable, were on the whole so beneficial not only for the Ruhr but for
the Federal Republic and even Europe that all but the most fanatical critics
of the coal-steel complex outside of the East Bloc were gradually di"sarmed.
Monnet may not have founded that. neo-corporati st pattern of economic and
social relationships known as

11

Germany, Inc. 11 - - - to which much of the credit

for the Wi rtschaftswunder is due--- but he did make an iniportant indirect
contribution to its success.

The continued threat· of decartelization fused

German management and labor into a strong, single line of defense against
attacks ·on jobs, plant, the unified energy grid, and the traditional marketing
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machinery.

In so doing Monnet contributed immeasurably to the success of

· co-determination, which his policies had promoted but German industry had
granted so grudgingly.

The French seige had a second even more extraordinary

consequence: it generated spontaneous support for coal and steel throughout
the German business community, much of which---whether in the Third Reich,
Weimar, or the old Empire---had bridled under heavy industry domination.· The
eloquent

expression

of.

this

was

the

investment

aid

law

(Investitionshilfegesetz), which was conceived in early 1951 by the president
· of. the Bundesverb·a_nd der deutschen I ndustri e, . Fritz
overcoming the effects of past underinvestment and
heavy industry had fallen victim.97

fortunes

to

a foreign

discrimination 11 to which

This mea·sure carried a message: Germans

were no more willing to sacrifice their coal
industrial

11

Berg, with a view to

power

and steel

than were

the

or entrust their
French.

Yet

the

investment aid law---the Federal Republic's answer to the Monnet Plan---did
not delay the process of Germany's return to international respectabifity.
On the private as well as the public plane, Monnet's anti-cartel campaign
furthered the process of "normal i zi ng 11 Germany I s foreign relations that was
begun by the Schuman Pl an announcement.
first

joint

reaction

of

Where December 1950 witnessed the

French :and German

producer associations against

Monnet 1 s methods, 1951 would bring the reappearance of international selling
syndicated for

specialized steel

products,

1952 the undertaking of joint

producer efforts to work out proposals for the org~nizational structure of the
High Authority, 1953 the conclusion of an agreement to form an lnternati anal
Export Cartel and,· more important yet, the organization of a body called
merely

11

The Cl ub 11 where producers from the Six ironed out pricing problems in

preparation for·the planned opening of the common market in steel.

In October

1954 the French Patronat and the German BDI would conclude pact of friendship
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every bit as comprehensive as the- one once sought by the economic appeasers of
the late 1930's.98
At the ministeri~l level a similar trend towards closer cooperation was
at work.

The unofficial German~led bloc of non-French delegations which

formed during the Paris sessions was re-formed at the beginning of 1952,. when
thanks to the ratification of the coal --steel treaty by .the French Assembly the
previous December, it was once again possi-ble for the bureaucrats to act free
of parliamentary interference.
auspices of

Meeting over the first-half of 1952 under the

a so-called Interim Committee convoked by the Germans without

I

Monnet s .kn owl edge

these

ci vi 1

servants

organized

the

administrative

structures of the High Authority in such a way as to banish for all time the
purported -evils of dirigisme.
father

of_ the

Luxemburg

The Interim Committee, not Monnet, is the true·
Eurocracy.

Among

its

main

features

was

a

decartelization -branch which, though empowered to co~duct investigations---a
task pursued zealously by its young-chief, Richard Hamburger, until his tragic
death in an automobile accident---could not act.

The real centers of power in

the coal-steel pool were the national governments, whose representatives sat
in the Council of Ministers, and heavy industry, which dominated the Advisory
Committee.99

As President of the High Authority Monnet could act decisively

only outside the framework of the Paris Treaty, his most important personal
accomplishment having been to secure an American loan on extremely favorable
terms which, being too large for the investment needs of the coal~steel pool~
turned the ECSC into an important international lender.
Yet Monnet's work was hardly a failure.

Monnet, and Monnet alone,

deserves credit for the remarkable coup d imagination known as .the Schuman
I

Plan and he, and he alone, had sufficient international
through its realization.

stature to push

If the European Coal and Steel community itself was
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a disappointment, the unintended benefits that grew out of the negotiations
surrounding it could probably not have been-achieved in any other way.

A Ruhr

restoration did of course take place, but one imbedded in a new context of
public control and social responsibilHy which, if: far from perfect, was a
substantial

improvement ~ver

arrangement,· and

the

prewar

indhidual s

conditions.

Thjs

who ·created it,

new

inspired

institutional
a

degree

of·

confidence which, aided by other favorable condf-ti ons, set the stage for the
adoption of considerably mote far-reaching
integration.

measures

of E~ropean

economic

Former members of the Interim Committee would soon_ regather to

launch the discussions which eventually culminated in the creation of the
European Economic Community.

In the space of astonishingly few years, the new

organization would complete the work· started by the Schuman Plan: reintegrate
Germany into Europe while realigning Europe around Germany, a process which,
in spite of countless frustrating delays, deserves great credit for having
brought the peace and prosperity of the past generation in _Europe.
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